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Abstract: In their 2017 article, “The Persistent and Exceptional Intensity of American Religion: A
Response to Recent Research,” Schnabel and Bock claimed that “intense religion . . . is persistent
and, in fact, only moderate religion is on the decline in the United States.” In this article, we show
that even the intensely religious segment of the American population is indeed shrinking. Schnabel
and Bock mistakenly concluded otherwise because their analytical strategy was not sufficiently
sensitive to detect very slow change (leading them to miss signs of declining intense religion on
the indicators they examined), they examined a limited set of indicators (missing still more signs of
declining intense religion), and they paid insufficient attention to cohort differences. Overall, their
empirical conclusion that “only moderate religion is on the decline in the United States” is simply
false. And their interpretive conclusion that “intense religion in the United States is persistent and
exceptional in ways that do not fit the secularization thesis” should be rejected.
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IN an article published in 2016 in the American Journal of Sociology (AJS), we askedwhether the United States is a counterexample to the secularization thesis (i.e.,
the idea that modernization tends to undermine religious belief and activity). We
provided evidence that it is not. Acknowledging the obvious fact that American
levels of religious involvement remain strikingly high compared to those in virtually
all highly developed countries, we claimed that:
“[F]or two straightforward empirical reasons, the United States should
no longer be considered a counterexample [to the secularization thesis].
First, it has recently become clear that American religiosity has been
declining for decades. Second, this decline has been produced by the
generational patterns underlying religious decline elsewhere in the West:
Each successive cohort is less religious than the preceding one. America
is not an exception” (Voas and Chaves 2016:1517–18).
In their 2017 Sociological Science article, Schnabel and Bock offered an alternative
view, claiming that “intense religion . . . is persistent and, in fact, only moderate
religion is on the decline in the United States” (2017:686). Because intense religiosity
is declining elsewhere in the developed world, they concluded that “intense religion
in the United States is persistent and exceptional in ways that do not fit the secu-
larization thesis.” Schnabel and Bock agreed with us that, on average, American
religiosity is declining, but they claimed that the share of the American population
that is highly religious has not declined even if the rest of the population is becom-
ing more secular, and for that reason, the United States remains exceptional. They
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did not address the second central point of our original article: Aggregate religious
decline in the United States is produced largely by generational replacement.
In this article, we show that even the intensely religious segment of the Ameri-
can population is shrinking. Schnabel and Bock mistakenly concluded otherwise
because they missed signs of declining intense religion on the indicators they exam-
ined, they examined a limited set of indicators (missing still more signs of declining
intense religion), and they paid insufficient attention to cohort differences. Overall,
their empirical conclusion that “only moderate religion is on the decline in the
United States” (2017:686) is simply false. And their interpretive conclusion that
“intense religion in the United States is persistent and exceptional in ways that do
not fit the secularization thesis” (2017:686) should be rejected.
Signs of Decline in Intense Religiosity Even on the
Schnabel and Bock Indicators
A major challenge for examining religious trends in the United States is that religious
change in the West is largely generational, as shown by a growing body of evidence
(for example, Hout and Fischer 2014; Kregting et al. 2018; Molteni and Biolcati 2018;
Ruck, Bentley, and Lawson 2018), and generational change usually is very slow. It
is hard to spot over short periods with conventional survey data; even a couple of
decades may not be enough. We pointed out in our 2016 article that it is only now
(45 years after the creation of the General Social Survey [GSS]) that the evidence for
decline is completely compelling. Schnabel and Bock missed clear signs of declining
intense religion even on the indicators they examined in part because they focused
only on the period since the late 1980s and in part because they did not look hard
enough for slow change. Year-to-year sampling error makes slow, long-term change
harder to spot, but the signal is there.
Schnabel and Bock examined five indicators of intense religion: strong religious
affiliation, attending religious services multiple times per week, biblical literalism,
affiliation with an evangelical religious group, and praying multiple times per day.
Panel A of Table 1 provides basic information about these items. Schnabel and Bock
asserted that all of these indicators display persistence, but this is incorrect. Three
of these five indicators of intense religion—affiliation, attendance, and literalism—
show clear signs of decline.
Figure 1 essentially reproduces the same intense religiosity trends for these
five items that were presented in Figures 1–5 in Schnabel and Bock’s article. We
have not exactly reproduced their trend lines because although we all are using
appropriately weighted General Social Survey data, we begin observing in 1973
rather than the late 1980s, and we limit analysis to the native-born population
who were 20 to 84 years old at the time they were interviewed. We limit analysis
to the native-born population so that we are comparing religious trends within a
population that is comparable across the observation period rather than comparing
the “apples” of a population that contains fewer immigrants earlier in the period to
the “oranges” of a population that contains more immigrants later in the period.
Results are substantively the same regardless of whether the analysis is limited
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Table 1: Indicators of intense religiosity from the General Social Survey.
Variable name Indicator Mean % 2006–2016 Survey years
Panel A: Schnabel and Bock Items
Reliten Calls self a strong [religious preference] 36.3 29 from 1974–2016
Attend Attends religious services several times per week 7.0 31 from 1972–2016
Bible “The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken
literally, word for word”
31.4 20 from 1984–2016
Reltrada Identifies with a denomination classified as evangelical 29.5 31 from 1972–2016
Pray Prays several times per day 29.1 20 from 1983–2016
Panel B: Additional Items
God “I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it” 58.4 12 from 1988–2016
Relpersn Considers self a very religious person 17.9 7 from 1998–2016
Punsin Agrees strongly that “those who violate God’s rules must
be punished”
14.7 4 from 1988–2010
Godmeans Strongly agrees that “to me, life is meaningful only be-
cause God exists”
19.1 3 from 1991–2008
Rellife Strongly agrees that “I try hard to carry my religious
beliefs over into all my other dealings in life”
28.7 4 from 1998–2010
aReltrad is not a GSS variable. It is constructed from GSS items asking about respondents’ religious affiliation using an
adapted and updated version of the variable developed in Steensland et al. (2000).
to the native-born population.1 We do not understand why Schnabel and Bock
examined the trends beginning only in the late 1980s, and we believe it is better to
use as much of the available data as we can.2
Notwithstanding the small differences between how we and they calculated
trend lines, our lines look qualitatively similar to Schnabel and Bock’s: There is no
large decline over this period on any of these indicators. But this is because decline
is slow and there is year-to-year sampling error fluctuation, not because there is no
decline.
Panel A of Table 2 shows the results when each of the five indicators used
by Schnabel and Bock is regressed on year. These results make clear that three
of these five lines—for strong affiliation, attending multiple times per week, and
believing that the Bible is the literal word of God—slope significantly downward.
The slopes for evangelical affiliation and frequent prayer are significantly positive
if viewed over the whole period since the questions were first asked, but there are
complexities regarding these two trends that are worth mentioning.
It is well known that a straight line is not the best representation of membership
trends in evangelical denominations in recent decades. The evangelical share rose
through the 1980s and has slowly declined since then (Putnam and Campbell
2010:104–5; Chaves 2017:93–99). When we regress year on evangelical affiliation
only since 1989, the slope is significantly negative, as reported in Table 2. Taking
a step back, we do not think belonging to an evangelical denomination is a valid
indicator of intense religiosity. There is substantial variation in religious intensity
across individuals in both evangelical and nonevangelical denominations, and we
have direct indicators of religious practice and belief, so we do not think that the
trend in evangelical affiliation is relevant for an assessment of intense religiosity.
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Figure 1: Intense religiosity by survey year (items used by Schnabel and Bock). Source: General Social Survey,
1973–2016.
But we retain it here because Schnabel and Bock used it, and we note that it, too,
has declined since 1989.
Regarding frequent prayer, there is an intriguing discontinuity in the GSS data
between 2002 and 2004. Between 1983 and 2002, there is essentially no change in
the percentage of those saying that they pray several times per day, but the value
jumps dramatically from 24.6 percent in 2002 to 32.2 percent in the next GSS survey
in 2004, and it declines thereafter. The later values are all higher than the earlier
values, so a trend line across the whole series has a positive slope, as shown in
Table 2. Looking at the segments separately, however, there was no change for the
first two decades and then a gradual decline (from a higher starting point) in the
later period.
It is not clear why the proportion of those reporting very frequent prayer jumped
dramatically between 2002 and 2004. The GSS made several methodological changes
in 2004. It was the first time that the GSS used a new sampling frame based on the
2000 census and the first year that the GSS subsampled respondents to use data
collection resources more efficiently. A code for “never” was added to the prayer
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Table 2: Logistic regression of intense religiosity indicator on survey year.
B
Variable name Indicator (standard error)
Panel A: Schnabel and Bock Items
Reliten Calls self a strong [religious preference] −0.004†
(0.001)
Attend Attends religious services several times per week −0.004†
(0.001)
Bible “The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word” −0.006†
(0.001)
Reltrad Identifies with a denomination classified as evangelical (all available survey years) 0.004†
(0.001)
Reltrad Identifies with a denomination classified as evangelical (survey years since 1989) −0.004†
(0.001)
Pray Prays several times per day (all available survey years) 0.009†
(0.001)
Pray Prays several times per day (survey years since 2004) −0.010∗
(0.005)
Panel B: Additional Items
God “I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it” −0.014†
(0.002)
Relpersn Considers self a very religious person −0.008
(0.004)
Punsin Agrees strongly that “those who violate God’s rules must be punished” −0.028†
(0.004)
Godmeans Strongly agrees that “to me, life is meaningful only because God exists” −0.013∗
(0.006)
Rellife Strongly agrees that “I try hard to carry my religious beliefs over into all my other 0.012
dealings in life” (0.007)
∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.01
item, though interviewers were instructed not to offer it as an option in probing
for an answer. There also is a question-order difference in the 2004 through 2016
surveys compared to the earlier surveys that could have had an effect.3 These
changes seem unlikely to have produced a jump of this magnitude, but it would be
interesting to investigate the cause of this discontinuity. We leave that for future
research. For now, frequent prayer appears to be an exception to the general pattern
of decline in intense religiosity, although the dramatic jump in 2004 raises questions,
and even this item shows decline since 2004.4
Panel A of Table 3 shows the percentage point differences on the most “intense”
response to these five items when the 2010 through 2016 surveys are aggregated
and compared to surveys aggregated over a similar time span at the beginning of
the data series for each item. The picture is clear and consistent with the regression
results in Table 2. Three of the five indicators show a clear decline in the proportion
of people who give the most intensely religious response. In 1974 through 1980,
38.1 percent reported a strong affiliation with a religious group, which declined
to 36.2 percent in 2010 through 2016. Attending religious services more than once
per week also declined from 8.1 percent in 1973 through 1978 to 6.6 percent in 2010
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Table 3: Intense religiosity indicators for pooled survey years (%).
Variable name Indicator Earlier Perioda 2010–2016b
Panel A: Schnabel and Bock Items
Reliten Calls self a strong [religious preference] 38.1 36.2
Attend Attends religious services more than weekly 8.1 6.6
Bible “The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word
for word”
35.0 31.2
Reltrad Identifies with a denomination classified as evangelical (all available
survey years)
25.4 28.7
Pray Prays several times per day (all available survey years) 24.6 28.8
Panel B: Additional Items
God “I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it” 64.4 56.9
Relpersn Considers self a very religious person 19.1 17.2
aThe earlier period pools a set of surveys beginning when the data series for each item begins. The earlier period varies
by item depending on the timing of GSS surveys and the years in which items were asked: Reliten (1974–1980), Attend
(1973–1978), Bible (1984–1990), Reltrad (1973–1978), Pray (1983–1989), God (1988–1994), and Relpersn (1998–2006).
bAll differences are significant at p < 0.01 in two-sample t-tests except for Relpersn, for which p = 0.02.
through 2016.5 And 35.0 percent said that the Bible is literally true in 1984 through
1990, dropping to 31.2 percent in 2010 through 2016. These differences are small,
but all of them are statistically significant. As noted earlier, the evangelical share of
the population increased from the 1970s to today, as did the percentage of people
saying that they pray several times per day.6
In sum, it is clear that intense religiosity declined in recent decades on three of
the indicators used by Schnabel and Bock. None of this decline in intense religiosity
is large. On the contrary, it is quite slow. But slow decline is still decline. And even
the two indicators that do not decline over this entire period—evangelical affiliation
and praying frequently—have declined in the most recent decades.
It is easy to understand why Schnabel and Bock missed the evidence of decline
in these measures. They examined a shorter time period, and they focused on
single–survey point comparisons at the beginning and end of the period rather than
increasing statistical power by combining adjacent surveys early and late in the
period. These analytical decisions led them to reach the incorrect conclusion that
there was no evidence of decline in intense religiosity in the items they examined.
Signs of Decline on Other Indicators of Intense Religiosity
The evidence for decline in intense religiosity is strengthened further by examining
indicators beyond those examined by Schnabel and Bock. There are at least five
additional indicators of intense religiosity in the GSS:
Chooses “I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it” when
asked which statement comes closest to expressing one’s belief about
God.7
Says “very religious” when asked, “To what extent do you consider
yourself a religious person?”
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Figure 2: Intense religiosity by survey year (additional items). Source: General Social Survey, 1988–2016.
Strongly agrees that “those who violate God’s rules must be punished.”
Strongly agrees with the statement, “To me, life is meaningful only
because God exists.”
Strongly agrees with the statement, “I try hard to carry my religious
beliefs over into all my other dealings in life.”
Panel B of Table 1 provides additional information about these items.
The signs of decline in intense religiosity are as clear in this set of items as
they are in the set of items examined by Schnabel and Bock. Figure 2 shows the
downward trend in most of the indicators. Panel B of Table 2 gives the results
of regressing each indicator of intense religiosity on year, and Panel B of Table 3
compares a pooled set of surveys from earlier and later periods for the two items
that were included often enough on the GSS to permit sensible pooling at the two
time periods.
The picture, again, is clear. The trend lines, regression coefficients, and pooled
comparisons display an unambiguous picture of decline for four of the five items. In
1988 through 1994, 64.4 percent of people said that they know God exists, declining
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to 56.9 percent in 2010 through 2016. The negative regression line slope for calling
oneself a very religious person does not quite reach statistical significance at the
0.05 level, but the decline is evident in the comparison of pooled surveys: In 1998
through 2006, 19.1 percent said they were very religious, dropping to 17.2 percent
in 2010 through 2016.8 Nearly one-quarter (23.1 percent) of respondents in 1988
strongly agreed that “those who violate God’s rules must be punished.” Only 14.7
percent did so in 2006 through 2010.9 The “life is meaningful only because God
exists” question has been asked only three times (in 1991, 1998, and 2008), but strong
agreement has steadily declined (from 22.9 to 20.1 to 19.0 percent, respectively).
Only the proportion of those who strongly agree with the statement, “I try hard
to carry my religious beliefs over into all my other dealings in life” has increased,
and from just a single survey year. The percentage rose from 25.1 in 1998, when it
was first asked, to 28.7 in 2006 through 2010.10 All of these differences, again, are
statistically significant.
Moving beyond aggregate trends in the most religious response on single items
yields still more evidence pointing to a decline in intense religiosity. For example,
the 1991, 1998, and 2008 surveys asked respondents how frequently their parents
attended religious services and also how frequently the respondent attended when
he or she was around 12 years old. Because there are significant gender differences
in religious service attendance, it is best to compare respondents’ current attendance
with the attendance of their same-sex parent (i.e., compare women with their
mothers and men with their fathers). Among female respondents on these three
surveys (pooled), 8.1 percent said they currently attend several times per week, but
11.7 percent said their mothers did the same. Among male respondents, 6.0 percent
said they attend several times per week, but 6.7 percent said their fathers did the
same. And overall, 11.6 percent of respondents said that they attended several
times per week at age 12, but only 6.9 percent do so now. These comparisons again
point to a decline in the intensely religious population.
Another approach, one that may be better than looking at extreme values of
individual items, is to operationalize intense religiosity as reporting high values
simultaneously on several different indicators. Given the constraints imposed by
the years in which the GSS asked various questions, and in light of our skepticism
concerning affiliation with an evangelical denomination as a valid measure of
intense religiosity, the best measure of this sort that we can construct combines
people who strongly identify with a religious group, report attending religious
services weekly or more, and say that they know without doubt that God exists.11
By now, it should come as no surprise that intense religiosity has declined by this
measure as well. Comparing surveys pooled from early in the period in which this
measure can be constructed with the most recent surveys, 19.8 percent of people
were intensely religious by this measure in 1988 through 1994, declining to 18.3
percent in 2010 through 2016. As before, the decline is slow, but it is statistically
significant. Slow decline is still decline.
Overall, intense religiosity clearly has declined in recent decades in the United
States. Operationalized as choosing the most religious response option on an
individual item, decline is evident on seven of the nine items available in the GSS
(not including evangelical affiliation, which at best is a measure of a different
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sort). Decline is also evident when comparing respondents’ reports of their current
religiosity to their reports of their parents’ religiosity and to their reports of their
own religiosity when they were children. And it is evident when using a measure
that combines high responses on several religiosity questions. The decline in intense
religion is slow, to be sure, but it has occurred nonetheless.
Signs of Decline in Cohort Differences in
Intense Religiosity
We have so far followed Schnabel and Bock in examining aggregate trends over time
in intense religiosity, and we have shown that contrary to their conclusion, intense
religiosity has declined in recent decades in the United States. But the evidence for
decline is even clearer when we focus on cohort differences, as we did in our AJS
article, rather than on year-to-year aggregate differences.
The five indicators used by Schnabel and Bock all show clear signs of intergen-
erational decline in recent years, as shown in Table 4, which uses the pooled 2010 to
2016 surveys to compare levels of intense religiosity among people born before 1945
and since 1975. People born before the end of World War II are far more likely than
those born since 1975 to feel a strong sense of religious affiliation, attend services
and pray very frequently, and believe that the Bible is the literal word of God. They
are somewhat more likely to belong to an evangelical denomination. All of these
differences are statistically significant. Such differences between the young and
the old might arise if people become much more religious as they get older, but
there is scant evidence of such individual-level change.12 As we showed in our AJS
article, religious decline is largely the result of more-religious older generations
being replaced by less-religious younger generations, whereas within-cohort change
is much less substantial. In particular, we showed that within-cohort effects on
affiliation are very minor,13 and focusing on strong affiliation (as opposed to strong
or somewhat strong affiliation, as we did in our original article) does not change
this. Attendance at services and belief in God are even less subject to within-cohort
change.
Figure 3 uses the 1973 through 2016 GSS surveys to provide a more detailed
look at cohort differences in intense religiosity for the 10 items listed in Table 1 (the
five examined by Schnabel and Bock plus the five additional items available in the
GSS). If only moderate religion is on the decline in the United States, as Schnabel
and Bock claim, then the levels of intense religiosity should be approximately the
same in every generation unless people become substantially more religious with
age than is plausible. In fact, the highly religious share declines from one cohort
to the next for every one of the 10 measures. And, apart from affiliation with an
evangelical denomination, the trend lines all have similar slopes, suggesting that
all of these indicators (with one exception) are measuring a common underlying
trait that is declining in frequency in the population. The exception is evangelical
affiliation, which has a flatter line. Only the youngest cohort is markedly lower
than the others. This different pattern supports our sense that evangelical affiliation
is not a valid indicator of intense religiosity and does not belong in this set of items.
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Table 4: Generation gaps in intense religiosity, 2010–2016 (%).
Old Young
Strong affiliation 49.0 27.8
Attends services frequently 10.5 4.2
Biblical literalist 39.3 25.2
Evangelical affiliation 30.6 26.0
Prays frequently 36.3 21.6
Old = born before 1945 (but aged <85 years). Young = born 1975–1994 (but aged ≥20 years).
Figure 3 is, of course, an oversimplified way to examine cohort differences
because it conflates cohort change with the possibility that people in every cohort
become more religious as they age. To sort that out, we need to examine results
for each cohort as it ages across the survey years.14 We did this in our AJS article
for the response, “I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it,” and
we found clear cohort differences with little sign of individual change with age or
over time.15 It would be tiresome to present and describe such graphs for each of
the 10 indicators of intense religiosity, but we have examined all of these graphs
and found the same pattern in eight of them: Each successive birth cohort is less
intensely religious than the one before, and there is little sign of people becoming
more intensely religious with age or over time.16
To illustrate the typical pattern, we show the results for two variables: biblical
literalism and self-description as very religious. Figure 4 highlights the decline
from one generation to the next in the proportion of the population identifying
the statement, “The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally,
word for word,” as the one that comes closest to describing how they feel about
the Bible. Across all GSS surveys, 40 percent of the respondents born prior to
1935 endorse this statement; among the respondents born since 1985, less than
one-quarter (23.6 percent) do so. The question was first included in the GSS in
1984, and there is little sign of within-cohort change in the more than three decades
since that time. Aggregate decline is occurring because more intensely religious
cohorts are gradually being replaced in the population by younger ones that are
less religious.17
Figure 5 shows the percentage of respondents who describe themselves as “very
religious” by decade of birth and survey year, using all the GSS surveys in which
this question was asked (1998 and 2006 through 2016). Among the respondents
born before World War II (in the years 1925–1944), one in four say that they are very
religious. Among the respondents born since 1985, only one in 10 say the same.
The lines (which represent each cohort aging over this 18-year period) are relatively
flat, suggesting that there is little within-cohort change over time. The 1935 to 1944
cohort jumps from 17.2 percent to 25.6 percent between 1998 and 2006, after which it
shows trendless fluctuation. The increase might be explained by boosted religiosity
in retirement or even by differential mortality (with religiously active people living
longer than others18), but it is probably just the consequence of an especially low
reading in 1998 (N = 151).
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Figure 3: Highly religious share by decade of birth. Source: General Social Survey 1973–2016, pooled.
At any rate, with some noise, eight of the 10 graphs look essentially like the two
just described, strongly implying that cohort replacement is driving a decline in
intense religiosity just as it is driving a decline in religiosity in general. Older, more
religious generations are slowly but surely being replaced by less religious people
born more recently.
As described earlier, we created a combined measure of intense religiosity based
on strong affiliation, weekly attendance at services, and belief in God with no
doubts. The generational contrasts on this measure are striking. The 2010 through
2016 surveys give us data on people born in the decade from 1925 to 1934 and
also young adults born between 1985 and 1994 (i.e., on older Americans and their
grandchildren). Among the older generation, nearly one-third (32.5 percent) qualify
as highly religious; only one in 10 (9.8 percent) of the young do so.
The cohort graphs that show a different pattern are for the two items already
discussed: praying several times per day and affiliation with an evangelical denom-
ination. Figure 6 shows substantial within-cohort change in frequent prayer until
2004: Most of the lines slope upward, suggesting that people tend to pray more
often as they get older. After 2004, however, within-cohort change seems to stop,
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Figure 4: Says that “the Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word” by decade
of birth and survey year, 1984–2016. Source: GSS 1984–2016; graph shows a three-survey moving average.
whereas differences between cohorts remain. It appears that until a decade or so
ago, people prayed more as they aged, with each successive cohort following a
similar trajectory. But the situation seems to be different since 2004, when the same
generation gaps appear for prayer as for the other indicators. Together with the
observation noted earlier about the large jump in reported prayer between 2002
and 2004, this unusual pattern deserves further attention.
The other exception to the typical cohort pattern is identification with a de-
nomination classified as evangelical. The various birth cohorts are not clearly
differentiated prior to about 1990, and most of the within-cohort change is in a
positive direction. Thereafter, the situation is similar to that for the other variables:
Each successive cohort has lower values than the one before, and those values are
relatively stable over time.
These exceptions notwithstanding, the cohort comparisons taken as a whole
provide overwhelming evidence of intergenerational decline in intense religiosity.
The differences between older and younger cohorts are being translated into an
aggregate decline, but that process is slow and easy to miss if one examines only
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Figure 5: Describes self as “very religious” by decade of birth and survey year, 1998–2016. Source: GSS
1998–2016; only points based on 100+ cases are shown.
changes in population totals. Anyone wishing to argue that intense religiosity in
the United States will persist at current levels is obliged to claim that religiosity
rises steeply with age, something for which there is scant evidence. The aggregate
change and the cohort evidence clearly point in the same direction: declining intense
religiosity in the United States.19
Conclusion
Secularization came late to the United States. The country is highly religious
compared to other Western nations, and more of its population is intensely religious.
When Schnabel and Bock claim that “the intensity of American religion is persistent
and exceptional,” however, they are mistaken. Even intense religiosity has eroded in
the United States in recent decades. They mistakenly concluded otherwise because
their analytical strategy was not sufficiently sensitive to detect very slow change,
they examined a limited set of indicators, and they paid insufficient attention to
cohort differences.
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Figure 6: Prays several times per day (%) by decade of birth and survey year, 1983–2016. Source: GSS 1983–2016;
graph shows a three-survey moving average.
The intensely religious population may be declining more slowly than the more
moderately religious population, but this is to be expected. Nominal members are
the first to defect, doubters are the first to disbelieve, and occasional churchgoers
are the first to stop attending; a committed core remains. Societies become more
secular not because no one is highly religious but because diversity in religiosity
increases (Wilkins-Laflamme 2014, 2016a, 2016b).
It would not be correct to conclude, however, that intense religiosity is holding
up much better than moderate religiosity. The indicators of strong affiliation,
frequent attendance at services, and firm belief all show appreciable decline in
aggregate and very substantial differences between young and old cohorts. Change
is slow, as is usually the case when it is driven by generational replacement, but
that is true for moderate religion as well. And in proportional terms, the declines in
moderate religiosity are similar in magnitude to the declines in more-than-weekly
attendance at services (from 8.1 percent in 1973 through 1978 to 6.6 percent in 2010
through 2016) or biblical literalism (from 37.3 percent in 1984 through 1987 to 30.7
percent in 2012 through 2016). The erosion of intense religiosity is less obvious than
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for nominal religiosity in part because it is harder to spot a decline in values that
are already low.
The question is whether the highly religious can successfully resist the force of
social change because America is somehow exceptional. The evidence leads us to
doubt it. America is not immune to religious decline; moreover, it is not exceptional
in the proximate cause of that decline, which is generational replacement. The
argument for American religious exceptionalism posits a peculiar resistance to
forces that have undermined religion in other modern societies. We doubt that the
United States is impervious to that sort of social change.
This is not the place to repeat our full argument about why the United States
should no longer be considered an exception to the secularization thesis. We
encourage interested readers to consult our original article. Suffice it to say here
that our basic point was that America is not a counterexample to the secularization
thesis because religious affiliation, belief, and practice in the United States have in
fact been declining for decades and because this decline has been produced by the
same generational patterns underlying religious decline elsewhere in the West: Each
successive cohort is less religious than the preceding one. The present article shows
that these claims apply to intense as well as moderate religiosity. The change is slow
but unmistakable. Intense religiosity in the United States is neither persistent nor
exceptional in ways that constitute a counterexample to the secularization thesis.
Notes
1 Respondents were only asked whether they were born in the United States from 1977
onward. For earlier years, and when there are missing values on the nativity question,
we treat being a resident in the country at age 16 years as a proxy. We estimate that less
than 2 percent of resident-at-16 respondents for the years 1973 through 1976 would have
been born abroad. See Voas and Chaves (2016:1529–30,1546–7) for an extended rationale
for limiting the analysis to the native-born population.
2 Schnabel and Bock say that they “focus on the time period from the end of the 1980s to
today, during which disaffiliation has been occurring more rapidly” (2017:688). We do
not think this is a good reason to limit attention to these years. The prayer and literalism
trends in Figure 1 begin later than 1973 because the GSS first asked these questions in
1983 and 1984, respectively. We exclude the unusually religious 1972 GSS sample to avoid
overstating religious decline.
3 In 2004, a question on images of the world and human nature was dropped from the
sequence of items on religion; a question on images of God had been dropped earlier.
In consequence, respondents were taken straight from a question about life after death
to the question about prayer, and it is possible that they were thereby primed to give a
more religious response to the prayer question than had been the case previously.
4 Surveys carried out by the Pew Research Center also show a decline in daily prayer
from 2002 to 2007 and then to 2014; see http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-
study/frequency-of-prayer/ and also http://www.thearda.com/QuickStats/qs_104_s.asp.
5 Attendance multiple times per week was greater than 7 percent for every survey between
1973 and 1988. Since 2010, the value has always been less than 7 percent.
6 Consistent with the curvilinearity and discontinuity that we discussed above, the
evangelical share of the population and the percentage of those saying that they pray
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several times per day also declined significantly in the most recent decades when we
aggregate the surveys starting in 1989 for evangelical affiliation (31.0 percent in the
pooled 1989–1994 surveys) and starting in 2004 for frequent praying (30.1 percent in the
pooled 2004–2008 surveys).
7 The other options are “I don’t believe in God”; “I don’t know whether there is a God,
and I don’t believe there is a way to find out”; “I don’t believe in a personal God, but I
do believe in a Higher Power of some kind”; “I find myself believing in God some of the
time, but not at others”; and “While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God.”
8 This question was first asked in 1998 and then not again until 2006.
9 This question was asked only in 1988, 2006, 2008, and 2010.
10 This question was asked only in 1998, 2006, 2008, and 2010.
11 We would have liked to include considering oneself very religious in this measure, but
this question was first asked only in 1998, and we wanted a measure that allowed us to
start observing earlier than that.
12 There might also be confounding period effects, but any plausible scenario would
involve higher levels of intense religiosity in the past than in the present.
13 Since 1988, “only [one-fifth] of the impact of cohort replacement [on having a strong
religious identity] is offset by positive within-cohort change. The very slight upward
drift within cohorts may represent a consolidation of religious identity with age” (Voas
and Chaves 2016:1543).
14 See Voas and Chaves (2016:1527–9) for why a graphical approach is appropriate and
more elaborate statistical strategies for disentangling age, period, and cohort effects are
unhelpful in this instance.
15 See Voas and Chaves (2016:1544–6) for more details.
16 All of these graphs are available from the authors upon request.
17 A curiosity here is that in most years, older baby boomers (born 1945–1954) are a little
less likely to be biblical literalists than younger baby boomers (born 1955–1964).
18 See Kim, Smith, and Kang (2015) for a recent examination of the well-established link
between religious service attendance and reduced mortality.
19 We have focused on evidence from the GSS, but surveys conducted by the Pew Research
Center in 2007 and again in 2014 also show a decline in the proportion of people choosing
the most religious answers to questions they asked, including believing in God with
absolute certainty, saying religion is “very important” in their lives, attending services
at least weekly, believing that scripture should be taken literally, and (as mentioned
earlier) saying they pray at least daily (http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-
study/).
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